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I.

INTRODUCTION

“To ‘touch upon’ a loss is not to cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires.”1
In February of 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Loos v. Immersion
Corp., 2 that under a securities fraud claim, “the announcement of an investigation, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish loss causation.” 3 The court followed in line with several other
circuit courts, which have denied a cause of action to plaintiffs who do not support their claim
with greater evidence than a drop in stock price and the subsequent announcement of an internal
or external investigation. This article will consider the relevant case history leading up to Loos,
as well as why the Ninth Circuit came to an incorrect conclusion given the purpose of securities
fraud claims.
As will later be revealed, most of the circuits (including the Ninth Circuit after Loos)
recently interpreted the securities fraud statute as having strict loss causation requirements. 4 This
interpretation results from a history of frivolous securities fraud claims in an attempt to win
settlement money from corporations. The strict standard adopted by Loos and other courts is an
overreaction to the threat of frivolous claims.

An investigation and a relating stock price

decrease should be enough to fulfill the loss causation requirement at the pleading stage of a
securities fraud claim.
Part II of this note will describe the history of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934’s
Rule 10(b) and the relevant cases that provide the foundation for the Loos decision. This section
will also explain the circuit split regarding whether an investigation is enough to plead loss
causation and provide a description of the facts leading up to the Loos decision, including the
1

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1632 (2005).
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 (9th Cir. 2014)
3 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *2-3 (9th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter short name referred to
as “Loos”).
4 Cite either the circuit court cases as examples or cite the portion of your article where this is described, or both.
2
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relevant factual findings of the district court that were conceded by the appellate court. Part III
will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision and its impact on the law of securities fraud. This
section will compare the Loos analysis with the approach adopted by other courts. Part IV will
summarize the main arguments within the circuit split and propose a more equitable solution.
II.
A.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK & BACKGROUND

Background on Loos: Immersion Corp. Stock Dip and Investigation

Despite a drop in stock price and the announcement of an internal investigation, the Ninth
Circuit in Loos held that the plaintiffs did not adequately plead the loss causation requirement of
the federal securities fraud statute. Immersion Corporation (“Immersion”) is publicly traded on
the NASDAQ stock exchange. 5 The company develops and licenses “haptics” technology,
which creates tactile feedback for handheld and medical electronic devices. 6 . In late 2009, John
Loos and other investors, 7 filed a class action against Immersion in the Northern District of
California for “violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a) and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's implementing regulations.”8
The company and five of its executives were named as defendants. 9
The District Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to adequately
plead scienter and loss causation. 10 But the court granted Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. The
Plaintiffs then amended the complaint, with the same causes of action. 11 The district court again

5

Id. at *3-4.
Id. Specifically, the technology creates a “pulse” when a button is pressed on the screen of a device. Id.
7 Cite to complaint. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”).
8 Id.
9 Id. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”).
10 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *4-5 (9th Cir. 2014).
11 Id.
6

2

granted the Defendants’ second motion to dismiss for failure to meet the previous deficiencies. 12
The Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.13
From the beginning of Immersion’s public offering in 1999, until the end of 2006, the
company was not profitable. 14 Immersion reported its first profitable quarter in the first quarter
of 2007 (“1Q07”) after receiving a $150 million settlement in a patent infringement claim. 15 In
an attempt to satisfy shareholders, the company disclosed that it would invest the funds in growth
initiatives to insure profitable quarters in the future. 16 In its 2Q07 disclosure and press release,
Victor Viegas, Immersion’s CEO and a named defendant in Loos, claimed that the company had
two successful quarters in a row due to strong sales in the Medical Division. 17 He also indicated
that revenue grew 19% in 2Q06 and expected further growth through international sales in
China.18
In the 3Q07 press release, Viegas noted another profitable quarter and claimed revenue
grew 39% over 3Q06. 19 Immersion again boasted profitability in 4Q07. 20 However, in 2Q08,
the company announced a net loss of $3.1 million. 21 Immersion attempted to highlight the
growth in revenues in 2007. 22 Nonetheless, the company reported a loss of $4.3 million in
3Q08. 23 The company continued to focus on revenue growth, which exceeded $10 million

12

Id.
Id.
14 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *5.
15 Id.
16 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *6 (9th Cir. 2014).
17 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *6-7.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *7-9 (9th Cir. 2014).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
13
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quarterly. 24 The company reported a $7.1 million loss in 4Q08 and a $7.5 million loss in 1Q09.25
Finally, the company admitted a decrease in revenues.26
On July 1, 2009, Immersion announced that the Audit Committee of the Board of
Directors would be conducting an internal investigation into previous revenue transactions in its
Medical division. 27 The company’s shares proceeded to drop 23% that day. 28 On August 10,
2009, Immersion advised investors not to rely on its prior financial statements.29
In its amended Form 10-K/A filed with the SEC, the company admitted to errors in
recording revenue and recognizing sales prematurely, violating generally accepted accounting
principles (“GAAP”) regarding three types of orders: (1) a “side agreement” with Chinese
customers for unauthorized shipping and payment terms; (2) products that were either
unavailable or not fully in the development stage at the time of sale; and (3) orders not delivered
in time, contained non-standard terms, or “lacked probable collectability.”30 As a result of these
errors, Immersion restated its earnings for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 1Q09. 31 The most significant
impact of the restatement was on fiscal year 2008, in which Immersion reversed $623,000 in
medical sales revenue and deferred another $3 million to later periods. 32 Although these figures
might lead a reasonable person to infer that Immersion Corp.’s fraudulent conduct caused the
investors’ financial injuries, the court held otherwise.33
B.

A Brief and Relevant History of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934

24

Id.
Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *9 (9th Cir. 2014).
26 Id.
27 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *9-10.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Loos v. Immersion Corp., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *10-11 (9th Cir. 2014).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *2-3.
25
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1.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5

Due to the Great Depression and market crash of October 1929, political pressure for
securities regulation resulted in the Federal Securities Act of 1933. 34 The 1933 Act regulates
public offerings and the sale of securities in interstate commerce. 35 The Act emphasizes
disclosure and is influenced by the philosophy of Justice Brandeis: “Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants: electric light the most efficient policeman.”

36

The 1933 Act is

complemented by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which acts as the enforcement
mechanism to the mandates of the 1933 Act. 37 The Exchange Act is essentially “a laundry list of
problems for which Congress articulated neither the means nor the end objective.” 38 The 1934
Act establishes the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and delegates authority to the
SEC to deal with securities issues. 39 While the Securities Act is concerned with the initial
distribution of securities to investors, the Exchange Act focuses on trading markets and the
parties involved in these markets, requiring continuous disclosure by participants. 40
The primary tool for enforcing the proper distribution of information to investors is Rule
10b-5, authorized under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 41 The Rule was adopted in
1942 pursuant to the SEC’s authority to proscribe rules to prevent deceptive practices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 42 The scope of the Rule is meant to be broad
and covers conduct by any corporation “so long as the misconduct is intentional and truly

34

COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT , SEC. REG. CASES AND M AT ERIALS § 1[B][1][a] 5 (7th ed. 2013).
Id.
36 Id (citing L.D. BRANDEIS, OT HER PEOPLE’S M ONEY 62 (1914)).
37 Id at § 1[B][1][b] 8.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id at 9, 10.
41 Id at § 13 695.
42 Id.
35
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deceptive in nature.”43 Enforceable both publicly and as a private right of action, the Rule is the
central antifraud provision of the federal securities laws. 44
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful to “use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors." 45 Additionally, SEC Rule 10b-5 (implementing § 10(b)) prohibits the following
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security”:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of b usiness which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person[.]46
There are six elements to securities fraud claim pursuant to §10(b) and Rule 10b-5:
1. A material misrepresentation or omission;
2. Scienter (i.e. a wrongful state of mind);
3. A connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of a security;
4. Reliance upon the misrepresentation (in “fraud-on-the- market” cases, presumption
that price of stock reflects all public information)
5. Economic loss; and

43

Id at § 13 696.
Id.
45 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
46 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
44
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6. Loss causation.47
The sixth element, loss causation, is defined as the “causal relationship between a material
misrepresentation and the economic loss suffered by an investor. ” 48 Loss causation can be
established by a revelation of fraudulent activity. 49 Plaintiffs commonly establish loss causation
by showing the following:
(1) identifying a ‘corrective disclosure’ (a release of information that
reveals to the market the pertinent truth that was previously concealed or
obscured by the company’s fraud); (2) showing that the stock price
dropped soon after the correct disclosure; and (3) eliminating other
possible explanations for this price drop, so that the factfinder can infer
that it is more probable than not that it was the corrective disclosure—as
opposed to other possible depressive factors—that caused at least a
‘substantial’ amount of the price drop. 50
The Fifth Circuit has a different threshold for establishing loss causation, called
materialization of the risk. 51 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s fraud caused a
material risk to go undisclosed. 52 If the misrepresentation “touches upon the reasons for the
investment’s decline in value” then the plaintiff can prove loss causation. 53
One might inquire as to the purpose of the loss causation requirement, given that
economic loss must be fulfilled in any case. The intent of the loss causation requirement is to

47

Citation needed.
Loos, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17813 at *13 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342, 125
S. Ct. 1627, 161 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2005)).
49 Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008).
50 Jonathan N. Eisenberg, Litigating Securities Class Actions § 2.06 (Matthew Bender) (quoting FindWhat Investor
Group v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1311 n.38 (11th Cir. 2011)).
51 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009).
52 Id.
53 Id.
48
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prevent Section 10(b) from becoming “an insurance plan for the cost of every security purchased
in reliance upon a material misstatement or omission.” 54 Valuation in securities litigation is
highly complicated and often speculative. 55 Stock prices are considered “a dynamic, not a static,
concept and the market may re-evaluate and re-price a stock on a daily, hourly or even
momentary basis."56 An expert’s opinion may be influenced by subsequent stock prices. 57 This
is particularly likely when the price drop occurs immediately following a disclosure of allegedly
fraudulent conduct. 58 Thus, one scholar speculates that loss causation solves an evidentiary
problem.59
Contrary to its nomenclature, loss causation in securities fraud is not based on tort
principles and did not originally appear in the text of the statute. 60 The courts previously used
“federal common law” to define a securities fraud claim. 61 The elements of the claim are mainly
judge-made law. 62 Early securities fraud litigation focused on the reliance element in order to
establish a sufficient nexus between the fraud and purchase of the security. 63 The loss causation
requirement was not codified until 1995. 64 Loss causation became an element of a securities
fraud claim when Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in

54

William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors, § 13.05 (8th ed. 2011)
(quoting Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), rev’d in part on other grounds, 459
U.S. 375 (1983)).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 845-46 (2009).
60 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 337, 343 (2006).
64 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 820-21 (2009).
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1995.65 In an effort to curb frivolous securities fraud claims, the PSLRA required pleading with
particularity.

66

Some courts analogize loss causation to proximate cause and look to whether the loss
suffered was a foreseeable result of the fraud. 67 Other courts place the burden on the defendant
to “sever” the link between the misrepresentation and the price drop or leave causation up to the
jury.68
The problem with the courts’ use of causation in securities cases: the courts are relying
on negligence principles while securities fraud is an intentional tort. 69 Causation is used in
negligence cases as a “process of logical determination” for deciding whether the plaintiff’s
injuries were too attenuated from the defendant’s actions. 70 In intentional tort cases, the
causation requirement is usually easier to fulfill since it is assumed that there is a close link, both
temporally and conceptually, between the wrongful conduct and the harm. 71 Courts also see the
defendant as blameworthy and are less concerned with the scope of harm. 72 There is also little
“risk of inefficient overdeterrence” for imposing liability for intentional torts. 73 Thus, the
purpose of loss causation is to take focus away from the harm itself. For example: it is irrational
to hold a lying executive during a rising stock market accountable while an executive who
commits fraud just before a stock market crash escapes liability. 74

65

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737 (1996).
Id. at § 105.
67 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 821 (2009).
68 Id. at 826-27.
69 Id. at 840.
70 21-101 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY A CT IONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 101.6 (Matthew Bender Rev.
Ed.) [3][a] n. 50 (citing Norwood v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 55, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 256 (Civ. Ct. Queens County
1978)).
71 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009)..
72 Id.
73 Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009).
74 Id. at 840.
66
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2.
a.

Supreme Court Case Law
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo

In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the loss
causation requirement for securities fraud by merely alleging that the price of the security at the
date of purchase was inflated due to a misrepresentation.

75

The plaintiffs in Dura

Pharmaceuticals76 claimed that the company made false statements regarding the profitability of
its prospective asthmatic spray device. 77 Although the price of the shares fell, it ultimately
recovered within one week.78
The Dura Pharmaceuticals Court set down the basic elements of the securities fraud
statute: “Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 forbids[:] (1) the use or
employ[ment] . . . of any . . . deceptive device, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security, and (3) in contravention of Securities and Exchange Commission rules and
regulations.”79 The Court also defined securities fraud as “among other things, the making of
any untrue statement of a material fact or the omission of any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made . . . not misleading."80 Dura Pharmaceuticals noted that the courts
have implied a private damages action from these statutes, which is similar to “common- law tort
actions for deceit and misrepresentation.”81
According to the Court, for publicly traded securities, a cause of action requires (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of

75

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1629 (2005).
Id. at 339 (plaintiffs included investors in the stock of Dura Pharmaceuticals Corp.).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Dura, 125 S.Ct. at 1630-31 (2005)(citing 15 USC § 78j(b))(internal quotation marks omitted).
80 Id. (citing 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2004))(internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. The right to private damages from an act of securities fraud holds a similar function to common law tort.
However, as mentioned earlier (n. 60, 61), the private right of action for securities fraud is based on judge -made law,
which focused on reliance rather than causation.
76
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a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. 82 Additionally, “[a]n inflated
purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss.”83 The
plaintiff cannot suffer a loss at the instant that the transaction takes place since the price of the
share at that moment allegedly represents its value. 84 The reselling of shares at a lower price may
represent economic circumstances rather than some form of misrepresentation by the company.85
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently establish loss causation by
merely stating that a misrepresentation led to an inflated purchase price. 86 Unfortunately, Dura
still leaves considerable room for interpretation. In general, plaintiffs may be able to recover
without a drop in stock price, a defendant company may be able to prevent recovery by plaintiffs
by disclosing unrelated negative information ahead of the actual fraud, and there is no
determination as to whether Dura applies to investors involved in multiple transactions. 87
Nonetheless, Dura establishes that loss causation is the key element and “gatekeeping
mechanism” for private securities fraud claims. 88
Dura is often credited as an attack on “abusive practices” in securities fraud cases. 89
Plaintiffs continued to bring securities fraud cases to court because they were so expensive to
litigate that they were often settled for large sums. 90 This created an incentive to initiate even
frivolous lawsuits in the hopes of receiving a settlement. 91 Professor Kaufman argues that, rather

82

Id.
Id.
84 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1630-31 (2005). An inconsistency is possible
here, in that although market price supposedly represents the value of a security, if fraud already occurred, then we
could not say with certainty that the price is an adequate determination of the security’s value.
85 Id. at 1632.
86 Id.
87 Fisch, Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud at 825.
88 Id.
89 Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws,
2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2005).
90 Citation needed.
91 Citation needed.
83

11

than create an onerous causation standard, the heightened pleading and sanctions standards of the
statute should deter frivolous suits.92
Although the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a circuit split in Dura, the case left a
considerable number of unanswered questions. For instance, the Court did not evaluate whether
loss causation must be pled with particularity, as is the requirement for the scienter element. 93
The Court only recognized that a short, plain statement of the loss causation is required. 94 Dura
also did not address corrective disclosures and what types of disclosures would be sufficient to
establish loss causation.95
C.
1.

Circuit Split

Meyer v. Greene (11th Circuit)

In Meyer, the plaintiffs, participants in The City of Southfield Fire & Police Retirement
System, appealed after the dismissal of their class-action securities fraud complaint again the St.
Joe Company and its officers for violating §10(b). 96 St. Joe was a publicly-traded real estate
development corporation. 97 Once the market crashed in 2008, the company’s holdings declined
and it halted many of its projects. 98 The investors claimed that St. Joe failed to disclose the
declining value of its assets in its quarterly and annual SEC reports. 99
On October 13th , 2010, a hedge- fund investor, David Einhorn, made a presentation,
which involved a discussion of St. Joe’s assets. 100 He claimed the assets were significantly

92

Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws,
2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 13 (2005).
93 William E. Knepper & Dan A. Bailey, Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors, § 13.05 (8th ed. 2011).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 2013).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2013).
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overvalued and that their decrease in value should be disclosed. 101 In the following two days of
trading, St. Joe’s stock dropped 20%. 102 Accordingly, investors filed a complaint on November
3, 2010, based on the drop in share price. 103 The district court dismissed the complaint for,
among other reasons, failing to adequately plead loss causation.104
On January 10, 2011, St. Joe’s disclosed the initiation of the SEC’s informal investigation
into the company’s impairment of real estate assets. 105 An order of private investigation by the
SEC followed on July 1, 2011, regarding federal antifraud securities provisions and reporting
requirements. 106 The investors amended the complaint to add these disclosures, but the district
court again dismissed. 107 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege loss causation since
“the Einhorn Presentation was based solely on publicly available information, and the SEC
investigations indicated nothing more than a risk of accounting problems.”108
On January 27, 2012, St. Joe announced that it would declare impairment of between
$325 and $375 million in assets for the fourth quarter of 2011. 109 Plaintiffs then amended their
complaint to add this information, which resulted in another dismissal. 110 The investors then
appealed to the circuit court.111
The court determined that the Einhorn Presentation did represent a corrective disclosure
because it did not disclose any new information and was based solely on publicly available

101

Id.
Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2013).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1193-94.
109 Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2013).
110 Id.
111 Id.
102
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information. 112 According to efficient market theory, the market price of a security reflects all
publicly available information.

113

Additionally, “the mere repackaging of already-public

information by an analyst or short-seller is simply insufficient to constitute a corrective
disclosure.”114 The court also held that the SEC investigations were not enough to sustain a claim
of loss causation since the SEC did not issue a finding—or indicate any allegations—of
wrongdoing. The court determined that the sole initiation of an SEC investigation does not
constitute a corrective disclosure.115
2.

In Re Bradley Pharmaceuticals (District of New Jersey)

In Bradley, the plaintiffs, a class of common stock investors, filed a complaint alleging
securities fraud against Bradley, a publicly-traded producer of over-the-counter and prescription
pharmaceuticals. 116 The plaintiffs alleged that Bradley made a $1 million “sham” sale of a cold
drug, Deconamine, “to artificially inflate Bradley’s net income for the Third Quarter of 2004 ”
without any expectation that consumers would keep the product. 117
Bradley disclosed the earnings from Deconamine in its Third Quarter Press Release on
October 28, 2004. 118 On February 28, 2005, the company issued a press release that the SEC was
commencing “an informal inquiry relating to the Company to determine whether there have been
violations of the federal securities laws.”119 Bradley’s stock price then immediately fell 26.4%. 120

112

Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1198 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1197(citing Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 691 (11th Cir. 2010)(Tjoflat, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
114 Id. at 1199.
115 Id. at 1201.
116 In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 824 (D.N.J. 2006).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 824-825.
119 Id.
120 Id.
113
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The company released a restatement of earnings in April, 2005, which did no t result in any
substantial change in share price. 121
The Bradley court rejected a “rigid and dogmatic, interpretation of Dura” in favor of
“pragmatic understanding[.]”122 The court theorized that the plaintiffs must show that knowledge
of the misrepresentation occurred before the drop in share price, but that the Dura opinion did
not address “what type of events or disclosures may reveal the truth” or how specific the
disclosure must be.123
The Bradley court highlighted the Supreme Court’s statement in Dura, that “pleading
rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.” 124 In re Bradley Pharms., Inc.
Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 829 (D.N.J. 2006)(quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 348, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 1634 (2005). The court held that, since the investors alleged that
Bradley’s stock price dropped after the alleged misrepresentations were revealed, this was
sufficient to satisfy loss causation. In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822,
829 (D.N.J. 2006).
3.

In Re Gentiva (Eastern District of New York)

Gentiva involved a home health provider that was paid in advance by Medicare via the
home health prospective payments system (“HH PPS”). 125 The plaintiffs alleged that, in order to
increase revenue, “Gentiva’s clinicians and managers were pressured by senior executives to
provide patients with medically unnecessary visits and services in order to reach the enhanced

121

Id.
In re Bradley Pharms., Inc. Secs. Litig., 421 F. Supp. 2d 822, 828 (D.N.J. 2006).
123 Id. at 828.
124 Id. at 829)(quoting Dura, 125 S.Ct. at 1634).
125 In re Gentiva Secs. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
122
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payment thresholds from Medicare.” 126 Gentiva employees effectively provided clients with
more services than necessary in order to boost profits. 127
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the company repeatedly represented in SEC filings
and other public statements that Gentiva was "in compliance" with Medicare "standards and
regulations". 128 The plaintiff identified three “partial disclosures” by Gentiva: (1) announcements
of the SFC and SEC investigations; (2) negative earnings releases; and (3) the SFC Report. 129 On
May 13, 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Senate Finance Committee began an
“investigation into the practices of companies that provide in-home therapy visits reimbursed by
Medicare, including Gentiva.”130 Gentiva’s stock then sank 7%. 131 On July 1, 2010, the company
issued a press release representing its active cooperation with the SFC, but that neither the SFC
nor the SEC initiated a formal investigation. 132 The stock then fell 11%. 133 Gentiva disclosed the
commencement of the SEC investigation on July 13, 2010.134 The stock price declined 9%.135
The Gentiva court rejected the idea that a disclosure of an investigation, standing alone, is
not a form of corrective disclosure. 136 The court reasoned that the actual form of the factual
allegations of fraudulent conduct is insignificant. 137 “The inherent veracity of the information is
the paramount concern and the form that it takes it not as critical.”138 The court found that the
announcement of this investigation was enough to establish loss causation. “The announcement
of a governmental investigation is the type of non-public new information that was not available
126

Id.
Id.
128 Id. at 362.
129 In re Gentiva Secs. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 In re Gentiva Secs. Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 352, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
136 Id. at 387-88.
137 Id.
138 Id.
127
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to the market, as opposed to something such as reports derived from a company's published
financials. The court cannot conclude that this information was already reflected in the price of
Gentiva's securities. In line with many district courts to have addressed this issue, the Court finds
that the fact that Gentiva's stock price dropped after these announcements belies such a
conclusion.”139 The court ultimately dismissed the claim for failure to plead scienter, but this does
not affect the court’s opinion on loss causation.140
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE LOOS DECISION

In Loos, the court demanded that the market must react to fraud, rather than just the “poor
financial health” of Immersion Corp. The quarterly reports indicated disappointing earnings, but
not necessarily fraudulent accounting practices. 141 The court compared the Loos case to Daou,
where the District Court determined that disappointing earnings were not sufficiently linked to
an alleged accounting fraud. 142 The Circuit Court reversed, citing a plausible connection. 143 The
court determined that $10 million in unbilled revenue was sufficient. 144 Accordingly, the court
determined the amounts and circumstances of Immersion were far less substantial than those in
Daou. 145 Therefore, the Loos court determined that the sufficient link in Daou was not apparent
in the Loos facts. 146 However, the court does not create any reasoning as to why $10M is
sufficient but over $3M is not.147, 148
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The court asserted that an outright admission or finding of fraud is not necessary.
However, evidence of a “risk” or “potential” for fraud is insufficient. 149 The court pointed out
that, when an investigation is announced, it is impossible to know what the investigation will
“ultimately reveal.”150 Nonetheless, one could speculate as to the result of an investigation. It is
probable that an investigation is announced because there is a strong possibility of fraud.
Nonetheless, the Court stated that such an announcement only puts investors on notice of
potential fraudulent conduct. 151 Any decline in share price is then a result of speculation and not
whether fraud truly occurred. The court stated that speculation should not be the “basis of a
viable loss causation theory.”152 This logic is questionable though. If the fraud is likely, then
investors can expect share price to decline drastically. If investors are unsure, the price may
decline slightly. If the investigation seems to be an unnecessary sham, investors will ignore the
disclosure.
A.

Implications for Current and Future Investigations and Securities Fraud
Claims

Since the circuits are far from consistent on the issue of loss causation, pleading
requirements for securities fraud will differ based on the circuit court. Loos leaves open the
possibility that other disclosures of investigations could be enough to fulfill the loss causation
requirement.

“So, there could potentially be instances in which the announcement of an

investigation occurs in a context different from that in Loos and in which plaintiffs press loss
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causation arguments arising from the announcement of an investigation.” 153 The holding in Loos
does not qualify what types of investigations are sufficient to establish loss causation. The
holding is specific to the facts of Loos and leaves open the possibility that investigations with a
stronger inference of fraud (whatever the requisite level required to establish a stronger inference
may be) could fulfill loss causation.
In a recent Fifth Circuit case, Amedisys, the court held that multiple disclosures are
sufficient to establish loss causation. 154 Amedisys, a publicly traded health services corporation,
provided unnecessary medical visits in order to receive Medicare reimbursement.
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plaintiffs alleged that Amedisys revealed the fraud through five “partial” disclosures including
(1) an analyst’s report on the fraud; (2) the resignation of two Amedisys executives; (3) a Wall
Street Journal article regarding the fraud; (4) disclosure of government investigations; (5) poor
quarterly earnings. 156 The stock later declined by 60 percent. 157 Although Amedisys argued that
none of these disclosures, standing alone, would be sufficient to establish loss causation, the
court held that the totality of these disclosures fulfilled loss causation.158
Professor Kaufman argues that the intentions of the PSLRA are often misinterpreted. 159
The causation required for a securities fraud claim in fraud-on-the- market cases is not of the
kind adopted in Dura. 160 The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant’s caused any
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decline in the price of the stock, but that the defendant’s misrepresentation created a disparity or
artificiality between the price of the stock and its actual value. 161 This intention is memorialized
by the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs on May 17, 1994.162
B.

Implications for Corporations

Due to the Loos decision, we now must figure out “when a company should announce the
commencement of an internal investigation and what information should the announcement
include.”163 Since the announcement of an investigation, standing alone, will not be enough to
establish a securities fraud claim, directors are not disincentivized to prevent disclosure. One
could argue that this is a benefit to shareholders, because companies are not deterred from
disclosing investigations, which may be pertinent to shareholders’ investment decisions.
The Loos holding creates greater incentive for companies to announce investigations, since they
will not automatically be subject to securities fraud suits. This allows for more transparency in
the marketplace. Shareholders will be informed of occurrences within the company.
By the same logic, though, one could argue that these anno uncements verify the fraudon-the- market cause of action as legitimate, since the stock price will reflect all the public
information on the company. Courts may be splitting hairs by arguing that an announcement of
an investigation correlated with a dip in stock price does not inevitably assume the existence of
fraud. In reality, investors may be under the assumption that fraud either did occur or is a
significant enough possibility that an investment in the company is considered too risky.
161
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In any case, companies can manipulate their disclosures in order to prevent securities
fraud litigation. Before disclosing an event that could be considered fraud, corporate officials
may disclose unrelated negative information that reduces the stock price. 164 Known as “walking
down the stock price,” this behavior prevents the shareholder from being able to point to the
alleged fraud as the cause of the stock price decline. 165 The corporation may also release
positive news at the same time as the possibility fraudulent ne ws, in order to offset the likelihood
of a stock dip. 166 Another technique is for the company to wait until market issues result in a
stock price fall and only then disclose the fraudulent conduct. 167 These examples show that a
corporation can use numerous techniques and devices to prevent a plaintiff from being able to
sufficiently plead securities fraud.
C.

Implications for future Cases

The Loos case is decided merely at the pleading stage. Would it be more equitable to
allow the claim to continue to discovery in order to find out whether fraud actually occurred?
If we allow the claim to proceed, the effect of the ruling would essentially create another
investigation alongside the internal, consulted, or SEC (or other agency) investigation. Is it
necessary to have two investigations of a company this early in the process? Could this cause
more problems for the company and its shareholders than the alleged fraud actually merits?
The solution is to decide which allegations of fraud warrant further discovery and which
are so attenuated as to be inadmissible at the pleading stage. The Loos court determined that the
facts of Immersion’s situation were insufficient to allow the case to continue.
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There are still a significant number of questions that must be answered before evaluating
the Loos decision: How often are investigations conducted on businesses? How often do these
investigations reveal fraud?

What proportion of securities fraud goes undetected (probably

impossible to determine)? How reluctant are companies to initiate an internal investigation? (If
they are very reluctant (and I would assume they probably are), then the disclosure of an
investigation should be strong evidence of underlying fraud.)
If we terminate a claim at the pleading stage, this may give more time for the company to
cover up the fraud or articulate what occurred in a different fashion in order to not scare off
investors. The average time between a misstatement of fact and the truth being revealed to the
market is 10.5 months. 168 This also makes determining the amount of harm difficult, since there
are many factors that could affect the stock price during this extended period. 169
If the announcement of an investigation is likely the result of some form of fraud, it may
make sense to allow the case to proceed. Court-ordered discovery would create a check on the
internal investigation.
Regarding the announcement of an investigation: “Everyone and their mother
knows exactly what that means … [t]here was an investigation because there was fraud …
[t]hat’s why the stock price tanks. Because if an investigation was ‘just an investigation,’ no one
would care, right? But they do. Know why? Because people with money on the line are much,
much, much smarter than people in black robes who might say ‘Oh, it's only an investigation, no
actual fraud.’”170 Professor Martin argues that a more appropriate rule would be to look at the
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stock price in the long term. 171 If the stock drops after announcement of an investigation and
continues to stay low, there is evidence of loss causation. 172 If the stock drops initially, but then
ultimately rebounds, there is no loss causation. 173
Some scholars argue that one disclosure is only considered to be inaccurate after a later
disclosure modifies or falsifies the previous one. 174 This view assumes that investors only see
disclosed information as either true or false and are therefore speculating until a later disclosure
proves their hypothesis. 175 However, in reality, investors take a more nuanced approach and
make an inference based on all the information they have gathered. 176 Investors then decided
whether these facts influence the value of the company’s securities. 177
Perhaps the trier-of-fact should be responsible for deciding whether a loss is the result of
the disclosure of fraud. 178 It may be inequitable to have a court decide how a reasonable investor
would behave while facing the same investment decision.
Defending securities fraud is extremely expensive and often results in settlements to
prevent a legal war of attrition from occurring. 179 The benefit of the Loos decision to companies
is that they will not incur substantial legal fees unless there is considerable evidence of fraud.180
The Loos decision may also be a reaction to the threat of frivolous suits by securities fraud
litigators.181
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Since Loos seems to be fact-sensitive, what types of announcements revealing an internal
investigation are sufficient to establish loss causation?
There is, at least, one positive aspect of the Loos decision: cases will not be brought until
an investigation is complete. This will prevent early, speculative cases from flooding the courts
until they are ripe with evidence of securities fraud. The decision falls in line with the classic
presumption that litigation should not overwhelm the court system. Loos acts as a gatekeeper for
securities fraud cases in the embryonic stage. But this standard may cause corporations to wage
a war of attrition by extending investigations as long as possible. Loos goes too far and adds a
requirement that prevents some securities fraud claims by plaintiffs who should be able to get
past the pleading stage.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of loss causation is difficult to fulfill and likely
inappropriate given the legislative history of the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit, as well as other
federal courts, has strong reasons for requiring hardline loss causation standards. The abuse of
the securities fraud claim prior to the PSLRA cost corporations millions of dollars in legal fees.
In order to prevent these frivolous suits, the legislature sought stricter requirements at the
pleading stage. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit and others have gone to far in their analysis of the
loss causation element. The purpose of loss causation is to show that a disclosure caused a
disparity between the stock price and the stock value. The analysis ends there. In Loos, the
plaintiff should be able to pass the pleading stage by showing that the corrective disclosures
revealed a difference in the stock price and the stock value. This should not be a difficult
requirement to overcome, given that Immersion Corp. falsified their revenue and did not uphold
GAAP. As the Supreme Court stated in Dura, “It should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff
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who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and
the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”182
The decision in Loos is incorrect in that it is naïve to assume that the “market cannot
possibly know what the investigation will ultimately reveal.” 183 If an investigation is necessary,
then there is a strong assumption by investors that the va lue of the stock will decrease. As the
Gentiva court correctly asserted, the actual form of the factual allegations of fraudulent conduct
is insignificant. 184 It is the significance of the disclosure that is relevant. This is, of course,
relative to the impact of the investigation and the proportion of the corporation’s business it
affects. In a relatively small corporation like Immersion Corp., improper accounting practices
can have an enormous effect on the value of the shares. We assume that market price adequately
reflects what investors perceive the value of the corporation to be. If that is so, then the fact that
an investigation is announced and the stock price dips should be enough to allow plaintiffs to
allege loss causation in a securities fraud claim at the pleading stage.
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